We state a switching lemma for tests on adversarial inputs involving bilinear pairings in hard groups, where the tester can effectively switch the randomness used in the test from being given to the adversary to being chosen after the adversary commits its input. The switching lemma can be based on any k-linear hardness assumptions on one of the groups. In particular, this enables convenient information theoretic arguments in the construction of sequence of games proving security of cryptographic schemes, paralleling proofs and constructions in the random oracle model.
Introduction
Testing pairing equations in bilinear groups is a fundamental component of numerous cryptographic schemes spanning public key encryption schemes, signatures, zero knowledge proofs and so on. We state and prove a switching lemma for testing pairing equations in bilinear groups, where an adversary is given some random group elements from one of the groups, and the pairing test (of equality and/or inequality) is performed on adversary's output and the same random group elements. We show that the tester can replace the random group elements in the test with a new set of fresh random group elements, effectively mimicking the behavior of a random oracle. This switching lemma can be based on any k-linear hardness assumptions on one of the groups. This not only enables convenient information theoretic arguments in the construction of sequence of games proving security of cryptographic schemes, it also allows more efficient protocols reminiscent of the Fiat-Shamir paradigm using random oracles [FS87] .
Fiat-Shamir paradigm is best illustrated by the conversion of 3-round sigma protocol [Dam] for proof of knowledge (PoK) of discrete logarithms to a random oracle based NIZK. Consider an example where the prover is trying to prove possession of the discrete logarithm x of a public value g x . In the first round the prover commits to a random value r by sending g r . In response, the verifier generates a fresh random value c and sends to the prover. The prover then responds with r + cx. This constitutes an honest verifier zero-knowledge PoK. In transforming this to a NIZK, a public random oracle H is used and the prover just transmits (g r , r + H(g r , g x ) · x). Essentially the random oracle induces the effect of a 'fresh' randomness that can be used for verification and is not under any effective control of the prover. In this paper we create an analogous effect in the standard model using the computational hardness of k-linear problems (such as DDH and DLIN) in bilinear groups. We show that even if the testing parameters are given to the prover, while verifying one can switch to freshly generated testing parameters with negligible change in probability of success of the verification.
As an immediate application, we show that the quasi-adaptive NIZK proofs of Jutla and Roy [JR13] for linear subspaces can be further shortened to constant-size proofs, independent of the number of variables and equations. In [JR13] , it was shown that for languages that are linear subspaces of vector spaces of the bilinear groups, one can obtain more efficient computationallysound NIZK proofs compared to [GS08] in a slightly different quasi-adaptive setting, which suffices for many cryptographic applications. In the quasi-adaptive setting, a class of parametrized languages {L ρ } is considered, parametrized by ρ, and CRS generator is allowed to generate the CRS based on the language parameter ρ. However, the CRS simulator in the zero-knowledge setting is required to be a single efficient algorithm that works for the whole parametrized class or probability distributions of languages, by taking the parameter as input. This property was referred to as uniform simulation.
The main idea underlying construction in [JR13] can be summarized as follows. Consider the language L (over a cyclic group G of order q, in additive notation) defined as L = l 1 , l 2 , l 3 ∈ G 3 | ∃x 1 , x 2 ∈ Z q : l 1 = x 1 · g, l 2 = x 2 · f , l 3 = (x 1 + x 2 ) · h where g, f , h are parameters defining the language. Suppose the CRS can be set to be a basis for the null-space L ⊥ ρ of the language L ρ . Then, just pairing a potential language candidate with L ⊥ ρ and testing for all-zero suffices to prove that the candidate is in L ρ , as the null-space of L ⊥ ρ is just L ρ . However, efficiently computing null-spaces in hard bilinear groups is itself hard. Thus, an efficient CRS simulator cannot generate L ⊥ ρ , but can give a (hiding) commitment that is computationally indistinguishable from a binding commitment to L ⊥ ρ . To achieve this the authors use a homomorphic commitment just as in the Groth-Sahai system, but use the simpler El-Gamal encryption style commitment as opposed to the more involved Groth-Sahai commitments, and this allows for a more efficient verifier.
Our contributions. For n equations in t variables, our quasi-adaptive computationally-sound NIZK proofs for linear subspaces require only k 2 group elements, under the k-linear decisional assumption [Sha07, CCS09] . Thus, under the XDH assumption for bilinear groups, our proofs require only one group element. In contrast, the Groth-Sahai system requires (n+2t) group elements and the Jutla-Roy system requires (n − t) group elements. Similarly, under the decisional linear assumption (DLIN), our proofs require only 4 group elements, whereas the Groth-Sahai system requires (2n + 3t) group elements and the Jutla-Roy system requires (2n − 2t) group elements. These parameters are summarized in Table 1 . While our CRS size grows linearly with n, the number of pairing operations is competitive and could be significantly less compared to earlier schemes for appropriate n and t.
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Note that Schnorr proofs of multiple equations in the random oracle can also be combined into a proof consisting of only two group elements (by taking random linear combinations employing the random oracle), but it still requires commitments to all the variables. The commitments lie in Z q , where q is the group order. Thus, our proofs are even shorter than Schnorr proofs. On the other hand, Schnorr proofs are proof of knowledge (as opposed to ours or Groth-Sahai), and can be slightly faster to verify as they only use exponentiation instead of pairings.
We also show that proofs of multiple linear scalar-multiplication equations, as well as multiple linear pairing product equations (i.e. without any bilinear terms) can be aggregated into a single proof in the Groth-Sahai system. This can lead to significant shortening of proofs of multiple linear pairing product equations. The comparisons are tabulated in Table 2 . We remark that this is in contrast to the batching of Groth-Sahai proof verification [BFI + 10], where the proofs were not aggregated, but multiple pairing equations were batched together during the verification step. We can use similar batching techniques to improve the verification step; therefore, we skip taking these optimizations into consideration.
While the cryptographic literature is replete with applications using NIZK proofs of algebraic languages over bilinear groups, and many examples were given in [JR13] involving NIZK proofs of linear subspaces, we focus on two particular cases where aggregation of proofs of linear subspaces lead to interesting results. We show that a construction of [CCS09] to convert key-dependent message (KDM) CPA secure encryption scheme [BHHO08] into a KDM-CCA2 secure scheme involved proving O(N ) linear equations in just four variables (under the DLIN assumption), where N is the security parameter. With our aggregation of proofs, the size of this proof (in the quasi-adaptive setting) is reduced to just four group elements from the earlier O(N ) sized quasi-adaptive proof (the Groth-Sahai proof requires O(N ) * 2 + 12 elements). It is also easy to see that the quasi-adaptive setting for proving the NIZK suffices, as is the case for most applications. As another application we reduce the size of the publicly-verifiable CCA2-IBE scheme obtained in [JR13] by another group element to just five group elements plus a tag. This makes it shorter than the CCA2-IBE scheme obtained using the [BCHK07] paradigm from hierarchical-IBE (HIBE) and in addition is publicly-verifiable.
Organization of the paper. We begin the rest of the paper with the switching lemma for bilinear tests in hard groups in Section 2. We recall the quasi-adaptive NIZK definitions in Section 3 and develop constant-size quasi-adaptive NIZKs for linear subspaces in Section 4. In Section 5, we apply our switching lemma to aggregate Groth-Sahai NIZKs. Finally, we provide application examples in Section 6. The hardness assumptions we use are standard and are summarized in Appendix A.
Switching Lemma for Bilinear Tests in Hard Groups
Consider bilinear groups G 1 and G 2 with pairing e and random generators g 1 and g 2 , respectively. Let 0 1 , 0 2 and 0 T be the identity elements in the three groups G 1 , G 2 and G T respectively. The pairing operation naturally extends to vectors of elements (by summation). In this section and the next two, vectors will always be row-vectors and will always be denoted by an arrow over the letter, e.g. r for (row) vector of Z q elements, and d as (row) vector of group elements.
Let D 1 be the distribution that chooses k elements from G 2 at random. Also, let D 2 be the distribution that chooses k × k matrices of G 2 elements at random. Let D 3 and D 4 be distributions over n × (k + 1) matrices from Z q .
Lemma 1 For any PPT adversary A that produces a length n vector of G 1 elements, let ∆ A be the following probability
Then, under the k-linear assumption for group G 2 , the following probability is negligibly close to ∆ A :
The absolute value of the difference in the probabilities is bounded by adv(klin), which is the maximum probability among all PPT adversaries of winning a k-linear challenge in G 2 .
Proof: Suppose the latter probability differs from the former by δ. Then, we will show that there is an adversary S, that can use A to distinguish a real k-linear tuple from a fake k-linear tuple (in G 2 ) with probability negligibly close to δ. So, let a k-linear challenger produce:
in the group G 2 , where χ is either (
Note that b i , r i and s i are chosen randomly and independently by the challenger. We remark that it is an easy exercise to show that the above formulation of k-linear assumption is equivalent to usual formulation where all r i = 1.
Let vectors r and s be defined component-wise as ( r) i = r i ·g 2 and ( s) i = s i , respectively. Define the k by k matrix B as the diagonal matrix with the i-th diagonal element set to −b i . Further, let B = B · g 2 .
S samples C ← D 3 , and D ← D 4 and chooses g 1 at random. It also samples a k by k matrix R of Z q elements. S sets R = R · B. Observe that R's entries are independently random. The adversary A is then given g 1 , g 2 , r, R, C, D. The adversary A in response produces f. Now, S checks that f is non-zero and noting that S has access to B · s · g, it performs the following bilinear test
When the k-linear tuple is a real tuple this is equivalent to
and is otherwise equivalent to testing
where r is another random k-tuple independent of r. Since A's response is independent of the s i 's, the probability of the former test holding (i.e. when the k-linear tuple is real) is just ∆ A (except for the negligible difference due to probability of the matrix product with s equaling zero even when individually the columns of the multiplicand are non-zero), whereas the probability under the fake k-linear tuple is at least ∆ A ± adv(klin) (again, except for the negligible difference due to the outcome s = 0). That completes the proof. We now state a corollary. Let D 1 be a way of choosing m by k matrices uniformly at random. Let D 3 , D 4 be distributions over n × m matrices from Z q .
Lemma 2 For any PPT adversary A producing a vector of n elements from group G 1 , let ∆ A be the following probability
Then, under the k-linear assumption for group G 2 , the following probability is negligibly close to ∆ A .
The absolute value of the difference in the probabilities is bounded by m · adv(klin).
Proof Sketch: First note that if m ≤ k, then the result follows information-theoretically, as a random k by k matrix is non-singular with high probability. If m > k, the result follows by a hybrid argument, applying the above Lemma 1 inductively.
Quasi-Adaptive NIZK Proofs
We recall here the definitions from [JR13] and provide a summary. Instead of considering NIZK proofs for a (witness-) relation R, the authors consider Quasi-Adaptive NIZK proofs for a probability distribution D on a collection of (witness-) relations R = {R ρ }. The quasi-adaptiveness allows for the common reference string (CRS) to be set based on R ρ after the latter has been chosen according to D. However the simulator generating the CRS (in the simulation world) is required to be a single probabilistic polynomial time algorithm that works for the whole collection of relations R.
To be more precise, they consider ensemble {D λ } of distributions on collection of relations R λ , where each D λ specifies a probability distribution on R λ = {R λ,ρ }. When λ is clear from context it can be dropped. Since in the quasi-adaptive setting the CRS could depend on the relation, an associated parameter language L par is considered such that a member of this language is enough to characterize a particular relation, and this language member is provided to the CRS generator.
A tuple of algorithms (K 0 , K 1 , P, V) is called a QA-NIZK proof system for witness-relations R λ = {R ρ } with parameters sampled from a distribution D over associated parameter language L par , if there exists a probabilistic polynomial time simulator (S 1 , S 2 ), such that for all non-uniform PPT adversaries A 1 , A 2 , A 3 we have:
Quasi-Adaptive Completeness:
Quasi-Adaptive Soundness:
Quasi-Adaptive Zero-Knowledge:
where S(ψ, τ, x, w) = S 2 (ψ, τ, x) for (x, w) ∈ R ρ and both oracles (i.e. P and S) output failure if (x, w) ∈ R ρ .
Note that ψ is the CRS in the above definitions.
Aggregating Quasi-Adaptive Proofs of Linear Subspaces
We summarize the linear-subspace QA-NIZK setting of [JR13] here and refer the reader to that paper for details.
Setup. Let G 1 , G 2 and G T be cyclic groups of prime order q with a bilinear map e : G 1 ×G 2 → G T chosen by a group generation algorithm. Let g 1 and g 2 be generators of the group G 1 and G 2 respectively. Let 0 1 , 0 2 and 0 T be the identity elements in the three groups G 1 , G 2 and G T respectively. We use additive notation for the group operations in all the groups.
Linear Subspace Languages. We consider languages that are linear subspaces of vectors of G 1 elements. In other words, the languages we are interested in can be characterized as languages parameterized by A as below:
Here A is an element of the associated parameter language L par , which is all t × n matrices of G 1 elements. The parameter language L par also has a corresponding witness relation R par , where the witness is a matrix of Z q elements : R par (A, A) iff A = A · g 1 .
Robust and Efficiently Witness-Samplable Distributions. Let the t×n dimensional matrix A be chosen according to a distribution D on L par . The distribution D is called robust if with probability close to one the left-most t columns of A are full-ranked. A distribution D on L par is called efficiently witness-samplable if there is a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm such that it outputs a pair of matrices (A, A) that satisfy the relation R par (i.e., R par (A, A) holds), and further the resulting distribution of the output A is same as D. For example, the uniform distribution on L par is efficiently witness-samplable, by first picking A at random, and then computing A.
QA-NIZK Construction. We now describe a computationally sound quasi-adaptive NIZK (K 0 , K 1 , P, V) for linear subspace languages {L A } with parameters sampled from a robust and efficiently witness-samplable distribution D over the associated parameter language L par . Our description here is self sufficient and relates to the scheme in [JR13] in that we linearly combine proofs of multiple elements yielding constant-size proofs. 
and all non-diagonal elements 0.
The common reference string (CRS) has two parts CRS p and CRS v which are to be used by the prover and the verifier respectively.
Prover P: Given candidate l = x · A with witness vector x 1×t , the prover generates the following proof consisting of k 2 elements in G 1 : p
Verifier V: Given candidate l , and proof p, the verifier checks the following (k 2 equations) :
Proof Intuition. Completeness and Zero-Knowledge are straightforward and are analogous to [JR13] .
Soundness: We prove soundness by transforming the system over two games. Game G 0 just replicates the soundness security definition. In Game G 1 the CRS is generated using witness A and its null-space, and this can be done efficiently by the challenger as the distribution is efficiently witness samplable. After this transformation, we show that that in the case of a certain event, a verifying proof of a non-language member implies breaking the k-linear assumption in group G 2 , while in the case of the event not occurring we can apply the Switching Lemma to bound the probability of the adversary winning. Game G 0 : This is just the original system. Consider an adversary A which wins if it can produce a "proof" p for which the pairing test e l p , CRS v
holds and yet the candidate l is not in L A . Let the advantage of adversary A in Game G 0 be ∆ A . Game G 1 : In this game, the discrete logarithms of the defining constants of the language L are given to the CRS generator, or in other words A is given (by the efficiently witness samplable property). Since A is a t × (t + s) dimensional rank t matrix, there is a rank s matrix W 
Observe that D has identical distribution as in game G 0 and the rest of the computations were same. So Game G 1 is statistically indistinguishable from Game G 0 and the advantage of A in Game G 1 remains ∆ A .
Suppose that A wins G 1 . Now, let us partition the Z q matrix A as A . Note that, since A 0 has rank t, the elements of l 0 are 'free' elements and l 0 can be extended to a unique n element vector l , which is a member of L A . This member vector l can be computed as l :
The proof of l is computed as p := l 0 · D . Since A wins G 1 , then ( l , p) passes the verification test, and further by design ( l , p ) passes the verification test. Thus, we obtain:
This gives us a set of equalities:
Also note that since l is not in the language, there exists an i ∈ [1, s], such that l 1i − l 1i = 0. Now we consider two cases depending on whether the following event E occurs or not:
We have: Pr[A wins
We show now that the first term is upper bounded by k · adv(klin). To that end, suppose we are given k number of k-linear challenges:
in the group G 2 , where χ u is either ( n i=1 s i ) · g 2 or random. We generate the CRS components g 2 and B · g 2 using the challenge components g 2 and {b uv · g 2 } u,v∈ [1,k] . Now, since A wins G 1 and event E occurs,
, say for u = w. This gives us a straightforward test for the k-linear challenge:
Thus we have: Pr[A wins
We now establish an upper bound on Pr[A wins G 1 ∧ ¬E]. In preparation to employ the (corollary to) switching lemma, we replace R in the verification test by R . Note the CRS p and CRS v remain the same as above, i.e. use R, and it is only the verification test which changes to e l p , CRS v
where CRS v uses R instead of R.
Let us define the following matrixR s×k , which is obtained by removing the repetitive columns in
Note that all the elements ofR are independently random elements from G 2 . Now, the condition for (A wins G 1 ∧ ¬E) can be rewritten as:
T . We note that these tests can be performed efficiently. Therefore, by the switching lemma, we have with negligible difference in probability:
T . This implies:
The last equation holds since the r iu 's were chosen after the adversary responded and ( l 1 − l 1 ) is a non-zero vector. Therefore, Pr[A wins
Combining all results, we have:
Aggregating Groth-Sahai Proofs
We show that proofs of multiple linear scalar-multiplication equations, as well as multiple linear pairing product equations can be aggregated into a single proof in the Groth-Sahai system. We will focus on describing the aggregation for the scalar-multiplication equations, as the results for the linear pairing product equations are obtained in almost an identical manner. Consider bilinear groups G 1 and G 2 with pairing e into a third group G T . Consider equations of the type
where the variables y i are to take values in Z q , the variables x i are to take values in G 1 . The constants a i are in G 1 , and scalar constants y i are in Z q . Moreover, t 1 is in G 1 . When the bilinear group is symmetric, i.e. G 1 = G 2 , and under the DLIN assumption, the Groth-Sahai NIZK proof of the above equation requires commitments to the variables, each commitment being of size three group elements (for both y i or x i ). In addition it requires a proof of nine group elements. When there are multiple equations of the above kind in the same variables, the commitments to the variables remain the same, but each equation requires nine group elements. In other words, if there are m + n variables and k equations, the full proof of the k equations has size 3 · (m + n) + 9k group elements.
We will now show that in the quasi-adaptive setting, the full proof of the k equations can be obtained with size 3 · (m + n) + 9 group elements. We first describe how the proof is done in the Groth-Sahai system, and then we will point out the relevant changes. The proofs and commitments actually belong to the Z q -module G 3 (where
We will write these groups in additive notation, and the bilinear pairing operation e(A, B) written in infix notation as A · B, with the pairing operation defining a tensor product G · G over Z q . Without loss of generality (see e.g. A2.2 in [Eis95] ), we can assume that G T = G · G. Further, this naturally extends to a tensor product G 3 ⊗ G 3 . One can also define a tensor product Z q · G, but since G is a Z q -module, this tensor product is just G.
Let
G 3 → G be group homomorphisms s.t. ι 1 • p 1 , and ι 2 • p 2 are identity maps in Z q and G resp. Note that the maps ι 1 and ι 2 naturally define a group homomorphism ι T from Z q · G (= G) to G 3 ⊗ G 3 , and similarly p 1 and p 2 define a group
The NIZK common reference string (CRS) consists of three elements from G 3 , i.e. u 1 , u 2 , u 3 ∈ G 3 . They are chosen as follows: u 1 = (α · g, O, g), and u 2 = (O, β · g, g), and u 3 = ru 1 + su 2 , for random α, β, r, s ∈ Z * q , and random g ∈ G\O. This real-world CRS u is sometimes also referred to as the binding CRS.
The map ι 2 (Z) is just (O, O, Z), and p 2 (Z 1 , Z 2 , Z 3 ) = Z 3 − α −1 Z 1 − β −1 Z 2 , which shows that ι 2 • p 2 is an identity map. It also shows that p 2 (u 1 ) = p 2 (u 2 ) = p 2 (u 3 ) = O. Now, the commitments to elements Z in G are made by picking r 1 , r 2 , r 3 at random from Z q , and setting c 2 (Z) = ι 2 (Z) + r 1 u 1 + r 2 u 2 + r 3 u 3 . Thus, p 2 (c 2 (Z)) = Z, and hence the name binding CRS.
The
For equations of the form (3) 1 , i.e. y · a + b · x = t 1 , a proof π (along with commitments to variables) is obtained by setting π = S ι 2 ( a) + R ι 1 ( b) + θ, where R is the matrix of rows (r 1 , r 2 , r 3 ), coming from c 2 (x i ), one for each commited variable x i , and S is the matrix of rows (r 1 , r 2 , r 3 ), coming from c 1 (y i ), one for each commited variable y i . The vector θ is set to be a random linear combination of H i u, where H i are finitely many matrices, and form a basis for the solutions to u • H u = 0. It turns out that these matrices H i are independent of the ZK simulator trapdoors α and β. Let "•" denote the dot product of vectors of elements from G 3 and G 3 w.r.t. product ⊗. The commitments c 1 , c 2 and the proof are verified by the following equation:
Quasi-Adaptive Aggregation
In the quasi-adaptive setting [JR13] , the NIZK CRS is allowed to depend on the language parameters, but with the further requirement that the ZK simulation be uniform. In the above context, the language parameters are a and b. Note t 1 is not a language parameter, as it is a quantity produced by the prover.
So, let there be k equations in the same variables, with the j-th equation being
In the above setting the prover produces k proofs, π j . We would like the prover to give a random linear combination of these proofs, where the randomness is fixed in the CRS setup. In the DLIN setting, we need two different linear combinations. Thus, let the CRS generator choose two random Z q -vectors ρ and ψ. The prover is required to produce
To be able to do so, the prover needs j ρ j · ι 2 ( a j ), j ρ j · ι 1 ( b j ) (and similar terms using ψ j ). The θ terms in the proofs need not be linearly combined, and the prover can just add one such term to each of π ρ and π ψ , as its purpose is only to allow zero-knowledge simulation. The CRS generator can certainly produce these elements and give them as part of the CRS. The CRS generator also needs to give as part of the verification CRS the terms ι 1 (ρ j ) j and ι 1 (ψ j ) j . In order to apply the switching lemma, we will later show that if a j are efficiently witness samplable, then the CRS generator can also simulate this CRS given ρ j · g and ψ j · g.
The verification is now done as follows:
Theorem 3 The above system constitues a computationally-sound quasi-adaptive NIZK proof system for equations (4) with parameters a j j , b j j , whenever a j j are chosen according to an efficiently witness-samplable distribution, and given any group generation algorithm for which the DLIN assumption holds.
Proof: Completeness of the above system is obvious by design. In the quasi-adaptive setting the zero-knowledge simulation is required to be uniform, i.e. a single efficient TM is required to simulate the CRS given the language parameters. In the above system, the vectors of randomness ρ and ψ are chosen by the CRS simulator randomly as well. Then, given the language parameters, it can generate the CRS using ρ and ψ. The zero-knowledge proof simulation is similar to the Groth-Sahai zero-knowledge proof simulation and we skip the details.
Focusing on the soundness proof, we define a sequence of games, starting with game G 0 which is just the (soundness) security definition game. The Adversary wins G 0 if it can produce t j j∈[1,k] , commitments to y and x, as well as proofs π ρ and π ψ , such that t j j do not satisfy the above equations (4) and yet the verification tests (5) and (6) pass.
In game G 1 , the challenger (efficiently) samples a along with witnesses a (s.t. a = a · g). The component j ρ j · ι 2 ( a j ) of the CRS is now generated as j ρ j · ι 1 ( a j ). The probability of the adversary winning G 1 remains the same as winning G 0 .
In game G 2 , the challenger generates j ρ j · ι 1 ( a j ) as j ι 2 (ρ j · g) · a j , and j ρ j · ι 1 ( b j ) as j ι 1 (ρ j ) · b j (and similarly for ψ terms). Note that each of a j is a vector of length n, and hence the first term is a length n vector of G 3 elements, and similarly the second term is a length m vector of G 3 elements. Similar change occurs in the verification tests (5) and (6). Again, the probability of the adversary winning G 2 is same as winning G 1 .
Applying projection p T to both sides of these versions of (5) and (6), and using the commutativity properties mentioned above, we get that if the adversary wins G 2 then
Thus, the probability of adversary winning G 2 is at most the probability that it produces t j j , c 1 , c 2 (not all zero, otherwise they are in the language), such that Equations (7) and (8) hold.
In game G 3 , the challenger generates the CRS as in G 2 but instead of a public verification of the proofs and commitments, it does the following: It first generates fresh random vectors ρ and ψ , and performs the following bilinear pairing test (using trapdoors α and β to efficiently compute p 2 ):
The adversary wins game G 3 if the k quantities ( b j ) p 2 ( c 2 ) + ( a j ) p 2 ( c 1 ) − t j are not all zero and the above test passes. The k quantities above being not all zero is equivalent to t j not being in the language. Note p 1 ( c 1 ) has been replaced by p 2 ( c 1 ). While map p 2 in Groth-Sahai system is an efficient map (given trapdoors α and β), the map p 1 is not efficient. However, it is the case that p 1 (f) · g = p 2 (f) for any f in G 3 . Thus, the equations (7) and (8) hold iff the tests (9) and (10) with ρ and ψ replaced with original ρ and ψ hold.
If the probability of adversary winning game G 0 is ∆, then by switching lemma ∆ is upper bounded by probability of adversary winning G 3 plus (k + 1) · adv(DLIN ). Now, the adversary winning game G 3 is at most 1/|q| 2 , and that completes the proof.
Applications
KDM-CCA2 Encryption [CCS09] . In the paper [CCS09] , the authors construct a public key encryption scheme simultaneously secure against key dependent chosen plaintext (KDM) and adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks (CCA2). They apply a Naor-Yung "double encryption" paradigm to combine any KDM-CPA secure scheme with any IND-CCA2 secure scheme along with an appropriate NIZK proof, to obtain a KDM-CCA2 secure scheme. In a particular construction, they obtain short ciphertexts by combining the KDM-CPA secure scheme of [BHHO08] with the IND-CCA2 scheme of [CS98] , along with a Groth-Sahai NIZK proof.
We show that the NIZK proof required in this construction can be considerably shortened. We defer the reader to [CCS09] for details of the scheme, and just describe the equations to be proved here. Consider bilinear groups G 1 and G 2 in which the K-linear and L-linear assumptions hold, respectively.
Let g 1 , · · · , g K , h 1 , · · · , h K be part of the public key of the KDM-CPA secure encryption scheme and let × G 1 × G 1 be a ciphertext from the IND-CCA2 secure encryption scheme, with label l. Let t = H( f, a, l), where H is a collision resistant hash.
The purpose of the NIZK proof is to establish that they encrypt the same plaintext. This translates to the following statement:
This translates into N + K + 3 equations in 2K variables. Using the Groth-Sahai NIZK scheme, this requires (2K)(L + 1) elements of G 2 and (N + K + 3)L elements of G 1 . In our scheme this requires L 2 elements of G 1 in the proof -1 under DDH and 4 under DLIN assumptions in G 2 .
CCA2-IBE Scheme [JR13] . The definition of CCA2-secure encryption [BDPR98] naturally extends to the Identity-based encryption setting [BCHK07] . In [JR13] , the authors construct a fully adaptive CCA2-secure IBE, which also allows public verification of the assertion that a ciphertext is valid for the particular claimed identity. The IBE scheme has four group elements (and a tag), where one group element serves as one-time pad for encrypting the plaintext. The remaining three group elements form a linear subspace with one variable as witness and three integer tags corresponding to: (a) the identity, (b) the tag needed in the IBE scheme, and (c) a 1-1 (or universal one-way) hash of some of the elements. It was shown that if these three group elements can be QA-NIZK proven to be consistent, and given the unique proof property of the QA-NIZKs, then the IBE scheme can be made CCA2-secure. Since, there are three components, and one variable the QA-NIZK required only two group elements under SXDH. We slightly shorten the proof to one element under SXDH. We defer the reader to [JR13] for details, and just describe the Key Generation and Encryption steps here. Setup: The authority uses a group generation algorithm for which the SXDH assumption holds to generate a bilinear group (G 1 , G 2 , G T ) with g 2 and g 1 as generators of G 1 and G 2 respectively. Assume that G 1 and G 2 are of order q, and let e be a bilinear pairing on G 1 × G 2 . Then it picks c at random from Z q , and sets f = g c 2 . It further picks ∆ 1 , ∆ 2 , ∆ 3 , ∆ 4 , ∆ 5 , b, d, e, u, z from Z q , and publishes the following public key PK:
, and k = e(g 1 , g 2 ) −∆ 5 ·b+u . Consider the language:
It also publishes the QA-NIZK CRS for the language L (which uses tags i, tag and h). It also publishes a 1-1, or Universal One-Way Hash function (UOWHF) H. The authority retains the following master secret key MSK: g 2 , f (= g c 2 ), and ∆ 1 , ∆ 2 , ∆ 3 , ∆ 4 , ∆ 5 , d, e, u, z.
Encrypt(PK, i , M ): the encryption algorithm chooses s and tag at random from Z q . It then blinds M as C 0 = M · k s , and also creates , where h = H(C 0 , C 1 , C 2 , tag, i ). The ciphertext is then C = C 0 , C 1 , C 2 , C 3 , tag, p 1 , p 2 , where p 1 , p 2 is a QA-NIZK proof that C 0 , C 1 , C 2 , C 3 , i, tag, h ∈ L.
With the scheme in this paper, the ciphertext needs just 1 element of proof p, instead of the two presented by the authors. To do this, our scheme can be extended to handle tags just as in [JR13] .
Definition 5 (XDH [BBS04] ) Consider a generation algorithm G taking the security parameter as input, that outputs a tuple (q, G 1 , G 2 , G T , e, g 1 , g 2 ), where G 1 , G 2 and G T are groups of prime order q with generators g 1 , g 2 and e(g 1 , g 2 ) respectively and which allow an efficiently computable Z q -bilinear pairing map e : G 1 × G 2 → G T . The eXternal decisional Diffie-Hellman (XDH) assumption asserts that the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem is hard in one of the groups G 1 and G 2 .
Definition 6 (SXDH [BBS04] ) Consider a generation algorithm G taking the security parameter as input, that outputs a tuple (q, G 1 , G 2 , G T , e, g 1 , g 2 ) , where G 1 , G 2 and G T are groups of prime order q with generators g 1 , g 2 and e(g 1 , g 2 ) respectively and which allow an efficiently computable Z q -bilinear pairing map e : G 1 × G 2 → G T . The Symmetric eXternal decisional Diffie-Hellman (SXDH) assumption asserts that the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem is hard in both the groups G 1 and G 2 .
Definition 7 (DLIN [BBS04] ) Assuming a generation algorithm G that outputs a tuple (q, G) such that G is of prime order q and has generators g, f, h $ ← − G, the DLIN assumption asserts that it is computationally infeasible to distinguish between (g, f, h, x 1 · g, x 2 · f, x 3 · h) and (g, f, h, x 1 · g, x 2 · f, (x 1 + x 2 ) · h) for 
